Thanks for posting this NB. I really appreciate your measured analysis of the reliability (and intentions, perhaps) of the source. Couple of things - I'm not sure I fully agree that "McCaffrey's position as a retired general allows him great freedom to make a no-holds-barred call about the facts on the ground as he sees them." [I should note here that Napoleon B has since changed his posting to "greater freedom," which was apparently his intended meaning] As you note, his position (and background) is in fact sure to bias his view toward one end or another...but I would go a little further. I doubt very much that "the facts on the ground" were seen by him at all - before we even get to how he sees them. He was there for one week. ONE WEEK. The majority of that time would have been taken up with high-level military and political meetings and reviewing reports and statistics gathered and interpreted by American military personnel. I would not equate this with "facts on the ground" and indeed his report shows several inaccuracies even at first glance. For example there are, according to UNHCR (who themselves often underestimate) closer to 4 million refugees and IDPs in Iraq and the neighbouring countries as a result of the war (as opposed to Gen McCaffrey's 2 million - see: UNHCR LINK). I VERY much doubt that any time at all was taken up by visits to these displaced communities and camps, interviews with Iraqi civilian victims of "collateral damage" from American activities, interviews with the victims of torture, including the Abu Ghraib victims (have we forgotten already?! See: BBC News LINK) or even substantial interviews with low-ranking frontline US soldiers.
I do take your point that this is a military perspective, and can only really be viewed in that context. However it is my firm belief that viewing political and humanitarian crises almost solely from a "military perspective" is precisely what worsens and perpetuates these crises. In such a perspective there is no mention of the gravity of the situation in terms of long term individual, community, and national trauma - for Iraqis or for Americans. There is no mention of extensive damage to international reputation and diplomatic leverage that this war has done to the US and her allies. And, perhaps worst of all, there is no space for a humanizing of the voices of 7 or 8 digit numbers of people who are suffering the daily effects of this war and the US-led approach to "winning" it.
So...yes - this report is certainly not an optimistic view of the situation and yes it is framed within a language (and a paradigm) that may be more likely to be paid attention to by Washington (though who really knows who's advice is listened to in these insane times - the Pentagon strongly advised against going into Iraq in the first place after all). However I personally feel that any review of the current situation in Iraq that paints it as, summarily, US armed forces in a "situation of strategic peril" is a significantly lacking perspective. I also strongly urge those of us who are not constrained by position (though this is debatable), to question far more critically the use of the word "success" in relation to any exit strategy from Iraq.
[I also want to post here my response to another blogger's comment on Napoleon B's posting...]
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1 comment:
Here is Napoleon B's response to my response...and my response to that....
NB:
I think the most important thing here is to keep what I think may be the actual purpose of McCaffrey's report in perspective. Again, I believe he is acting as a surrogate of sorts for commanders who have been on the ground for quite some time. So, even if his visit only lasted a week, he's channeling the observations and judgments of people who have been there much longer.
Now, there's no doubt that the views of general officers are far removed from those of the troops out on patrol, to say nothing of the attitudes of Iraqis out on the streets. But let's remember that this report is being fed into the hopper aimed at producing strategic politico-military solutions, not tactical adjustments. Moreover, the military does a surprisingly good job of getting that ground-level perspective up the chain of command, because commanders at all levels are by nature in close contact with their soldiers.
Of course, yes: It still remains a military outlook, an American one -- not a civilian view, and not an Iraqi one. (Though I note that McCaffrey did meet with embassy officials, USAID and UN reps, and Iraqis.) But let's face it, we are at a stage in the game now where the nature of the insurgency and the overall security situation are such that it's essential to talk about solutions that are, as they say, kinetic. And it makes sense for him to tailor the thrust of his message for the audience who will read it. However, that does not mean that the military piece is the only one, nor that it has been formulated in a vacuum. On the contrary, military planning in a counterinsurgency/nation-building environment is dominated by a whole spectrum of civil affairs considerations.
It's also important to remember that the military's dominant role harks back to the beginning of this adventure and the days when the Donald Rumsfelds of Washington did everything in their nearly unlimited power to ensure not only that the advice of non-DoD agencies was ignored, but even that people from those agencies were excluded as much as possible from positions within the Coalition Provisional Authority. The resulting uninformed amateurism (which was disorganized to boot) left the troops in the field in the default position of soldier-statesmen. It wasn't a role they wanted, nor was it one they were particularly good at in many ways.
By the time the effort got underway to inject qualified civilians into the picture, the security situation had deteriorated to the point where their successful participation was difficult or impossible to arrange in any case. So, the military continues to carry the ball to a large extent -- and that's another reason why I think they want to start making it clear just how big that ball is that they've had handed off to them.
In fact, the damage done to our national image by things like Abu Ghraib extends far beyond the borders of Iraq, and considering how to repair those effects and others requires far more than just military calculations. And it's getting much more than that. However, I can tell you that any country's strategic planning for national security and the conduct of international diplomacy rarely, if ever, relies on such things as face-to-face contact with a very broad spectrum of concerned groups or populations (e.g., refugees) by principal actors at the level of general officers or ambassadors and above. But you can also be certain that there are people who do go out and do those things, and then do their best to convey some sense of what's going on where the ground really is the ground, and to advocate for effective, sensible policy.
Yet, there's no getting around the fact that we Westerners always have been something of a fish out of water when it comes to operating in the Middle East, and the many shortcomings resulting from that fact could hardly have been avoided even if we had done better than not even a half-assed job at the beginning of all this. The cultural and linguistic differences are steep, and even trained and experienced diplomats encounter great difficulties. That's why asking a twenty-something-year-old squad leader whose primary goal is to bring 10 men home alive to function as a kind of stand-in diplomat doesn't always work in our interests.
Posted by Napoleon B on Wednesday, March 28, 2007 at 5:19 PM
T:
Thanks again for engaging with me in this dialogue NB - I think it's important as well as interesting.
I don't think we're entirely in disagreement with each other here. I certainly agree and understand that its in the military's interests to, as you put it, "start making it clear just how big the ball is that they've had handed off to them." But what I don't agree with you on is the idea that the report is a fully "frank assessment" that is "grimly accurate" - as you said in the first posting. My main beef, though, which perhaps I didn't communicate properly, is with the sad reality (and I do acknowledge it as a reality) that reports like this are what shape policy and inform high-level decision makers. I mean he calls them "poor Iraqis" for crying out loud! And he says that they "batter each other to death with our forces caught in the middle" - caught! As if by accident.
I also don't agree with you that there are all that many "people who do go out and do those things (I presume you mean gather accurate and comprehensive data?), and then do their best to convey some sense of what's going on where the ground really is the ground, and to advocate for effective, sensible policy." Certainly such people exist, more often than not working out of community-based NGOs or sometimes in the "background" of govt aid agencies - I know first-hand from having worked in Bosnia and Herzegovina (albeit in a post-conflict setting). But the fact is that they are far fewer in number and FAR weaker in voice than the many high-ranking military personnel writing reports and advising policy. And, in my opinion, this is the key problem. It is a structural problem and it is a normative problem. I mean why the hell aren't we demanding of our leaders that they seek advice from a diversity of sources? And why isn't there more transparency about how the decisions actually are made?
Okay so maybe it's a no-brainer to say that the ones making the decisions and holding all the power are either ill-informed about and/or disconnected from and/or disinterested in the lives of those who are affected by the decisions that they make. Maybe to say that this must be changed, flipped on it's head, is so ambitious as to be almost absurd. But I nonetheless believe it is a relevant and important comment to make in response to the posting of yet another military perspective on the situation in Iraq; a perspective which may or may not be heard by Washington but which certainly has a greater chance of being noticed than a report from Amnesty International and which likely significantly watered down what direct information it did drawn from.
Once again, it was you who said that the report was "grimly accurate," though you seem to contradict that stance somewhat in your response above. I am well aware that "any country's strategic planning for national security and the conduct of international diplomacy rarely, if ever, relies on such things as face-to-face contact with a very broad spectrum of concerned groups or populations (e.g., refugees) by principal actors at the level of general officers or ambassadors and above." VERY well aware of that reality. Does that mean that we shouldn't point out that it could and should be otherwise?
And perhaps this is where I didn't frame my comment very clearly. I don't deny (nor didn't in my previous response) that Gen. McCaffrey's report had a very specific purpose. I was simply trying make a case for how and why that purpose could and should be different, broader, more human. So perhaps, on some points, we're arguing two sides of the same coin here. One of us saying yes the situation is screwed so, being pragmatic, how can we cut our losses and get out of it; one of us saying yes, the situation is screwed, and what can be learnt and what needs to be changed to not just get us out of the situation but also to acknowledge what we did to contribute to it and ensure we don't do it again.
I don't discount the context in and intent with which the report is written, but I also believe in speaking truth to power and calling a spade a spade. Primarily I think I was pushing back against the suggestion that the report was truly a "frank assessment of the situation in Iraq" and that it outlined what conditions needed to be met for "success" in Iraq. Discourse, after all, has a real power to shape the reality it describes, and I believe the situation in Iraq is such that a "frank assessment" would be much more damning and comprehensive and would acknowledge that there is no real "success" to be had at this stage...unless you define success in terms of the welfare of a very limited and empowered few people. And at very least it would have been good to see some qualified definition of what was meant by "success" in the report. I also would have liked a bit less petting of the Armed Forces' and the American patriotic egos ("most trusted institution in our society"?! Cmon!)...but I won't push my luck.
Posted by T on Thursday, March 29, 2007 at 12:47 AM
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